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NOTES
ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: THE SUPREME COURT
TAKES AN INTERNATIONALIST VIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the tremendous increase in American participation in
international commerce has led to ever-increasing commercial contacts be-
tween Americans and citizens of other nations. These multinational contacts
have brought about complex legal relationships which have resulted in
conflict of laws and jurisdictional problems, which in turn have generated
unwelcome uncertainty in international business transactions. One response
to this uncertainty has been the insertion in international business contracts of
arbitration or forum selection clauses-both to invoke the parties' chosen
place and manner of dispute resolution and, in some cases, to avoid the
possible extraterritorial application of American law. But arbitration and
forum selection clauses have not always been enforced. Two recent Supreme
Court decisions' have addressed the use of such clauses in the international
business environment. In these decisions, the Court has held that there are
certain inherent limitations on the transnational application of American law
and that judicial application of American law might vary in the international
as opposed to the domestic context. One decision enforced an arbitration
clause; the other enforced a forum selection clause. This Note will examine
the development of extraterritorial application of American law; the use of
arbitration and forum selection clauses in an international context; and the
implications of the Supreme Court's two recent decisions in this field. Some
particular attention will be given the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 since a
number of the decisions in this field have involved that Act and it provides,
therefore, a convenient and pertinent example for discussion.
11. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN LAW
The jurisdiction of a state and its concurrent ability to apply its law to a
particular situation 3 traditionally were based on a territorial principle-the
state could impose its will on individuals for acts committed within its
1. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 94 S. Ct. 2449 (1974); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970).
3. This section, in treating the extraterritorial application of American law, attempts to
provide, very briefly, a legal background for the discussion that will follow on arbitration and
forum selection clauses in an international context. The section does not purport to treat the
closely related and very difficult subject of conflict of laws. The Byzantine complexities of that
subject are treated, fully and with great erudition, in the following works. A. Ehrenzweig,
Private International Law (1972); A. Ehrenzweig, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1962); H.
Goodrich & E. Scoles, Conflict of Laws (4th ed. 1964); R. Leflar, American Conflicts Law (rev.
ed. 1968); R. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws (1971).
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borders. 4 This basis subsequently has been expanded by the development of
other grounds for the assertion of jurisdiction.- For example, the use of
nationality as a basis for the application of domestic law is now well
recognized. "A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law . . . attaching
legal consequences to conduct of a national of the state wherever the conduct
occurs ... ."6 The national interest of the forum state also has been used as a
basis for the extraterritorial application of its law. The national interest
theory may be regarded as an outgrowth of a protective principle, which was
traditionally restricted to activities that threatened the security of the state or
its governmental functions7 but which has expanded to include areas of law
involving long standing public policy and overriding public interest. 8 Ameri-
can courts have given extraterritorial effect to the antitrust statutes, "comer-
stones of this nation's economic policies,"9 on such a rationale.
4. Committee on International Law, Report, 21 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 240, 244-45 (1966); R.
Leflar, American Conflicts Law 3-4 (rev. ed. 1968); Note, Extraterritorial Application of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 94, 95-96 (1969).
5. Four principles have been used to describe these other grounds: (1) the nationality principle
under which jurisdiction is based on the nationality of the person committing the offense; (2) the
protective principle which is designed to protect national interests; (3) the universality principle
which is based on having custody of the individual who committed the offense; and (4) the
passive personality principle which uses the nationality of the person injured as the basis for
jurisdiction. Committee on International Law, Report, 21 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 240, 245
(1966).
6. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 3011 (1965); see R.
Leflar, American Conflicts Law 45-46 (rev. ed. 1968). The Supreme Court has recognized the use
of nationality as a basis for the application of domestic law with the caveat that - 'the rights of
other nations or their nationals . . . not [be] infringed.' " Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 587
(1953), quoting Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941).
Where corporations are involved the determination of nationality may be difficult. Place of
incorporation is important, but not necessarily controlling. The corporation's principal place of
bujiness, as well as the nationality of its investors and management, may be considered. Vagts,
The Corporate Alien: Definitional Questions in Federal Restraints on Foreign Enterprise, 74
Harv. L. Rev. 1489, 1490, 1526-50 (1961). See also Note, The "Nationality" of International
Corporations Under Civil Law and Treaty, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1429 (1961).
7. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 33 (1965).
8. Joseph Muller Corp. Zurich v. Societe Anonyme de Gerance et D'Armement, 451 F,2d
727, 729 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972).
9. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 903 (2d Cir. 1968); see Pacific
Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far E. Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1093 (1969); Kintner & Halgarten, Application of United States Antitrust Laws to Foreign Trade
and Commerce-Variations on American Banana Since 1909, 15 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 343
(1973).
An earlier case, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), gave
extraterritorial effect to the American antitrust laws based on an objective territorial principle
(discussed at note 10 infra and accompanying text). Said Judge Learned Hand- "Both agreements
would clearly have been unlawful, had they been made within the United States; and it follows
... that both were unlawful, though made abroad, if they were intended to affect imports and
did affect them." Id. at 444.
In Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970), the Court held the Jones Act, 46
U.S.C. § 688 (1970), applicable in a personal injury action between a Greek seaman and his
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The extraterritorial application of the securities laws has experienced a
similar expansive development, albeit on a somewhat different rationale. In
securities cases the courts have continued to rely on the old territorial
principle, but have expanded it almost beyond recognition by applying it in
its objective and subjective form. The objective territorial principle bases
jurisdiction on acts commenced or committed outside the territory of a state
but completed or having substantial effects therein. 10 The subjective territor-
ial principle bases jurisdiction on some act committed within the state even
though the activity is completed abroad."
One of the earliest cases dealing with the extraterritorial application of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was Kook v. Crang. 12 In that case, an
American purchased stock of a Canadian corporation traded on the Toronto
Exchange through a Canadian broker. The only other connection with the
United States was that the broker maintained an office in New York, but
that office was not involved in the sale.' 3 The American brought suit
claiming a violation of the margin requirements under section 7(c) of the
Greek corporate employer despite the fact that the contract of employment provided for the
application of Greek law by a Greek court to any claims arising out of the employment. Tle
seaman's injury occurred in American waters, but the Court did not rest its decision on that fact.
Rather, the Court emphasized the operational contacts that the Greek corporation had with
America (95% of its stock was held by a Greek citizen domiciled in America and its business in
America was extensive) and the competitive advantage it would have over American corporations
if held exempt from the Jones Act. Rhoditis is not an antitrust case, but the fundamental policy
the decision purports to promote-economic competition-is an antitrust policy.
10. Committee on International Law, Report, 21 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 240, 245 (1966);
Note, The Extraterritorial Application of Rule 10b-5, 4 Cornell Int'l L.J. 81, 82 (1970); 10
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 150, 152-53 (1971). The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States has incorporated the objective territorial principle. "A State has jurisdiction
to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory
and causes an effect within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a crime or tort
under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the rule applies;
(ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of
the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice
generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems." Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 18, at 47 (1965); see text accompanying
notes 17-21 infra. For an argument that territoriality principles should give way to interest-based
analyses in transnational securities cases, see Comment, An Interest Analysis Approach to
Extraterritorial Application of Rule 10b-5, 52 Texas L. Rev. 983 (1974).
11. Section 17 of the Restatement (Second) outlines the subjective territorial principle: "A
state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law (a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that
occurs within its territory, whether or not such consequences are determined by the effects of the
conduct outside the territory, and (b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest
localized, in its territory." Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 17, at 45 (1965); see text accompanying notes 22-27 infra.
12. 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
13. Id. at 389.
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Securities Exchange Act. 14 The district court dismissed on the basis of section
30(b) which exempts "any person insofar as he transacts a business in
securities without the jurisdiction of the United States . . . ."" The court
specifically rejected the use of the telephone and malls within the United
States as a basis of jurisdiction. 16
Eight years later, however, the Second Circuit took a different view in
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook. '7 An American stockholder brought a derivative
suit under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5'8 against a Canadian corporation and
its directors. The stockholder alleged that the defendants had sold corporate
treasury shares at market prices which, based on insider information, they
knew did not represent the true value. All of the questionable transactions
took place in Canada but, unlike Kook, the stock involved was traded on an
American exchange. 19 Rejecting a section 30(b) defense, 20 the court held "that
Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial application in
order to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on
American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the
effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities." 2' The Second
Circuit thus adopted the objective territorial principle by holding that an
action consummated outside the United States will be subject to the jurisdic-
tion of American courts if that action has significant adverse effects on
American investors or exchanges.
In Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,22 the Second
Circuit was faced with a similar case which, however, appeared to lack the
significant effect of Schoenbaum. In Leasco, the plaintiffs contended that the
British defendants conspired to have Leasco purchase the stock of a British
corporation at an artificially inflated price in violation of section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5. Much of the negotiations had taken place abroad, and the claim of
American jurisdiction was based on fraudulent statements made in New York
and in transatlantic mail and telephone communications. 23 The court rejected
the Schoenbaum objective territorial principle as factually inapplicable,
doubting whether the "impact on an American company and its shareholders
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (1970).
15. Id. § 78dd(b).
16. 182 F. Supp. at 390.
17. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) ten banc).
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
19. 405 F.2d at 204-06.
20. The court construed section 30(b) as exempting only those who conduct a "business in
securities" outside the United States and not "persons who engage in isolated foreign transac-
tions." Id. at 207-08.
21. Id. at 206; see Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968). cert denied,
394 U.S. 975 (1969). See generally Griffin, The Power of Host Countries Over the Multinational:
Lifting the Veil in the European Economic Community and the United States, 6 Law & Policy
Int'l Bus. 375, 398-401 (1974).
22. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
23. Id. at 1330-31.
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would suffice to make the statute applicable if the misconduct had occurred
solely in England .... "24 Instead, the court relied on section 17 of the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States25 holding
that when there was conduct within the United States, this "alone would
seem sufficient from the standpoint of jurisdiction ... 26 and that the making
of substantial representations within the United States constituted such
conduct. 27 Thus, whereas Schoenbaum had expanded the extraterritorial
application of the Securities Act objectively through the significant effects
test, Leasco did so subjectively utilizing the significant conduct test.
III. FORUM SELECTION AND ARBITRATION AS ALTERNATIVES
TO THE TRANSNATIONAL APPLICATION
OF DOMESTIC STATUTES
To assure some degree of certainty regarding the legal implications of their
international transactions, businessmen, as noted above, have often resorted
to two devices-forum selection and arbitration clauses. These clauses have
met with varying degrees of receptivity in American courts and occasionally
have come into conflict with the extraterritorial application of United States
law.
A. The Forum Selection Clause
Forum selection clauses historically have been frowned upon by the
judiciary. 28 Reasons for this aversion generally include the fact that such
clauses oust the court of jurisdiction, 29 "disturb the symmetry of the law" by
24. Id. at 1337. Judge Friendly also stated: "However, the language of § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act is much too inconclusive to lead us to believe that Congress meant to
impose rules governing conduct throughout the world in every instance where an American
company bought or sold a security. When no fraud has been practiced in this country and the
purchase or sale has not been made here, we would be hard pressed to find justification for going
beyond Schoenbaum." Id. at 1334.
25. See note 11 supra.
26. 468 F.2d at 1334.
27. Id. at 1337. In dictum, the court also stated that it saw "no reason why . ..making
telephone calls and sending mail to the United States should not be deemed to constitute conduct
within it." Id. at 1335. See Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973) where
the court apparently followed this dictum as its basis for jurisdiction in a section 10(b) action. In
Travis, although there was some conduct within the United States, all of the fraudulent
misrepresentations were made in international mail and telephone communications. The court
stated "that both the place of sending and place of receipt constitute locations in which conduct
takes place when the mails or instrumentalities of interstate commerce are used to transmit
communications." Id. at 524 n.16.
28. Judge Learned Hand told one commentator "that it was his guess that this judicial
aversion dates from the time ... judges were paid by the case and accordingly viewed arbitration
and choice of forum provisions as devices that were likely to curtail their income." Reese, The
Contractual Forum: Situation in the United States, 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 187, 189 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Reese].
29. Hall v. People's Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 185, 192 (1856); Delaume, Choice
of Forum Clauses and the American Forum Patriae; Something Happened on the Way to the
[Vol. 43
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placing the will of the parties above that of the law, 3  tend to be found in
adhesion contracts3 1 and often lead to great inconvenience. 3 2 Advocates of
forum selection clauses point out, however, that such clauses provide a degree
of certainty required in international business dealings, 3 3 avoid many of the
jurisdictional problems often found in multinational litigation, 34 and fre-
quently are the result of extensive negotiations aimed at choosing a neutral
forum. 35 Despite these latter arguments, judicial opposition to forum selection
clauses has continued.
36
Judge Learned Hand is given credit for adopting what is known as the
modem view toward forum selection agreements. In Krenger v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 37 Judge Hand stated that there was no longer any "absolute taboo
against such contracts" and that a test of reasonableness should be used in
evaluating the effect to be given them.38 This reasonableness test was
reaffirmed by the Second Circuit in Win. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish
American Line, Ltd., 39 an admiralty case dealing with a choice of forum
clause in a shipping contract. The case was brought under the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act,40 but the court found no congressional intent to invalidate
such clauses and concluded that enforceability depended on reasonableness.a
Forum: Zapata and Silver, 4 J. Maritime L. & Com. 295, 296 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Delaume]; Reese 188.
30. Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174, 180 (1856); Reese 188.
31. 25 Fordham L. Rev. 133, 137 (1956).
32. See Delaume 296.
33. See 25 Fordham L. Rev. 133, 136-37 (1956).
34. Id.
35. See Collins, Forum Selection and an Anglo-American Conflict-The Sad Case of the
Chaparral, 20 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 550, 556 (1971); Comment, The Transnational Reach of Rule
10b-5, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1363, 1393-94 (1973) [hereinafter cited as The Transnational Reach of
Rule 10b-5].
36. E.g., Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958), cert.
dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959) (forum selection clauses against public policy).
37. 174 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 866 (1949).
38. Id. at 561. Professor Weintraub indicates that the reasonableness test "appears to be the
emerging consensus of United States courts." R. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of
Laws 163-64 (1971). The Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws § 80, at 244 (1971) states:
"The parties' agreement as to the place of the action cannot oust a state of judicial jurisdiction,
but such an agreement will be given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable." The official
comment to this section points out that such a provision should be disregarded if there is
overreaching, unequal bargaining power, or if the forum chosen would be seriously inconvenient.
39. 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955).
40. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1970). Plaintiff alleged that § 1303(8) prohibited the enforcement
of any forum selection clause. 224 F.2d at 807.
41. 224 F.2d at 807-08. Muller was subsequently overruled by Indussa Corp. v. SS.
Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967). However, it appears that Indussa overruled Muller only
insofar as it was in conflict with the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8)
(1970), and not in relation to its reasonableness test for forum selection clauses. Shipping
contracts are usually of the adhesion variety and one of the purposes of COGSA was to prevent
such contracts. Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschiffahrts-
Gesellschaft, 375 F.2d 943, 945 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967); Delaume 298;
1974]
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Judicial acceptance, however, was not uniform. The Fifth Circuit, in an
almost identical case, 42 refused to enforce a forum selection clause indicating
that the purpose of such clauses was to oust the court of its jurisdiction and,
as such, was contrary to public policy. 43
B. Arbitration Clauses
Initially, the common law aversion to forum selection clauses was carried
over to arbitration agreements, in some cases, with even greater vigor. 44
However, businessmen realized the many advantages of arbitration over
traditional litigation 45 and, in 1925, Congress passed the Arbitration Act46
with the partial intent of forcing the courts to accept the validity of agree-
Nadelmann, Choice-of-Court Clauses in the United States: The Road to Zapata, 21 Am. J.
Comp. L. 124, 134 (1973).
42. Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958), cert.
dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959).
43. Id. at 300-01.
44. Judge Cardozo, in discussing forum selection clauses and arbitration agreements stated:
"Indeed, the considerations adverse to the validity of the contract are more potent in the latter
circumstances, for in the one case we yield to regular and duly organized agencies of the state and
in the other to informal and in a sense irregular tribunals." Meacham v. Jamestown, F. & C.
R.R., 211 N.Y. 346, 353, 105 N.E. 653, 655 (1914). Critics of arbitration point out that there Is
little respect for precedent, with a consequent inconsistency of result; that there are fewer
safeguards such as adherence to the rules of evidence; that there is no judicial review for errors of
law or fact; and that there is a limited ability to appeal. Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.)
344, 349 (1854) (no judicial review for errors of law or fact); American Almond Prods. Co. v.
Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448, 450-5 1 (2d Cir. 1944) (no need to follow the rules of
evidence); Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. United Cas. Co., 142 F.2d 390 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 729 (1944) (arbitration binding despite errors of law); Lentine v. Fundaro,
29 N.Y.2d 382, 385, 278 N.E.2d 633, 635, 328 N.Y.S.2d 418, 421 (1972) (arbitrators are not
bound by substantive law or rules of evidence); see 1 J. Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-
American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 4e (3d ed. 1940); Kawakami &
Henderson, Arbitration in U.S./Japanese Sales Disputes, 42 Wash. L. Rev. 541, 543-44 (1967);
Phillips, A Lawyer's Approach to Commercial Arbitration, 44 Yale L.J. 31, 36-37 (1934).
45. Arbitration is considered an efficient, informal, flexible, confidential, quick, and inexpen-
sive manner of handling disputes. In addition, arbitral tribunals often utilize individuals who are
familiar with the customs and practices of the trade. It is particularly well suited to the settlement
of international disputes where the inconvenience, expense, and uncertainty caused by jurisdic-
tional and conflict of laws problems often make multi-national litigation all but an impossibility.
American Almond Prods. Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448, 450 (2d Cir. 1944);
Kawakami & Henderson, Arbitration in U.S./Japanese Sales Disputes, 42 Wash. L. Rev. 541,
542, 545 (1967); McMahon, Implementation of the United Nations Convention on Foreign
Arbitral Awards in the United States, 2 J. Maritime L. & Com. 735 (1971). For a discussion of
the rules and procedures used in international arbitration, see Cohn, The Rules of Arbitration of
the International Chamber of Commerce, 14 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 132 (1965); Eisemann,
Arbitrations under the International Chamber of Commerce Rules, 15 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 726
(1966).
46. Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970). Sections 1 and 2 of the Act limit its
scope to arbitration agreements in contracts or transactions which are either maritime or involve
interstate or foreign commerce. See Evans & Ellis, International Commercial Arbitration: A
Comparison of Legal Regimes, 8 Texas Int'l L.J. 17, 18-28 (1973).
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ments to arbitrate. 47 Faced with such specific legislative action, the courts
have given increasing support to arbitration agreements-so much so, that
calls are now being heard to restrict the scope of the acceptance of such
agreements. 4 8
However, one significant exception was made to the judicial acceptance of
arbitration agreements. In Wilko v. Swa, 4 9 the Supreme Court refused to
enforce an arbitration clause in a securities contract (not involving any
international aspects) holding that "the protective provisions of the Securities
Act require the exercise of judicial direction to fairly assure their effectiveness
.. .. ,o Wilko involved an action brought against a brokerage firm under
section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.51 Wilko claimed that he purchased
stock on the basis of false representations made by the broker.52 The
defendant firm moved for dismissal pursuant to section 3 of the United States
Arbitration Act5 3 claiming that the agreement between the parties had
specified arbitration as the method of settling disputes. Wilko, however,
claimed that the arbitration agreement was void according to section 14 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 4 since the arbitration agreement was a
"condition, stipulation, or provision" which was designed to force him to
waive his access to the courts which was guaranteed by section 22 of the
47. See H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1925) which stated: "Arbitration agreements
are purely matters of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply to make the contracting party
live up to his agreement. He can no longer refuse to perform his contract when it becomes
disadvantageous to him. An arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing as other
contracts, where it belongs." (quoted in Standard Magnesium Corp. v. Fuchs, 251 F.2d 455,
457-58 (10th Cir. 1957)).
48. See Note, The Consequences of a Broad Arbitration Clause Under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, 52 B.U.L. Rev. 571 (1972).
49. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
50. Id. at 437.
51. Section 12(2) provides: "Any person who-offers or sells a security . .. by the use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails,
by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a
material fact or omits to state a material fact... and who shall not sustain the burden of proof
that he did not know. . . shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who
may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction 15 U.S.C.
§ 771(2) (1970).
52. The broker recommended the purchase of stock in a company on the basis of a supposed
merger with a larger corporation and implied that there would be significant speculative profits.
However, he failed to inform Wilko that some or all of the stock he was purchasing was being
sold by a director of the subject corporation. 346 U.S. at 428-29.
53. Section 3 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1970), provides: "If any suit or proceeding
be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under
an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being
satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such
arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement . ... "
54. Section 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1970), provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this
subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void."
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Act.55 The Court recognized the conflict between the two congressional acts,
pointing out that the purpose of the Arbitration Act was "to secure prompt,
economical and adequate solution of controversies through arbitration"
56
whereas the Securities Act was "[d]esigned to protect investors" and "created
a special right to recover for misrepresentation."
5' 7
The Court held that the agreement to arbitrate was a "stipulation" under
section 14 of the Securities Act and, as such, was void. 58 Even though the
arbitration agreement bound the arbitrators to adhere to the Securities Act, 5 9
the Court indicated that the effectiveness of the Act would be less "in
arbitration as compared to judicial proceedings. '60 Arbitration of this type of
fraud required "subjective findings" of fact on the part of the arbitrators
without any "judicial instruction on the law."'6' Since arbitrators can make
awards "without explanation of their reasons and without a complete record,"
the Court felt that there was no possible way to judicially review their
interpretations of the law short of a "manifest disregard" of it. 62 Lacking such
judicial review and feeling a need for judicial interpretation of the Securities
Act provisions, the Court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement. 63
Wilko, if read broadly to embrace the international context, thus added
another facet to the extraterritorial application of American securities law.
Not only did American law apply to international dealings in securities which
produce "significant effects" within the United States or in which there was
some "significant conduct" within our borders, 64 but it also precluded a
foreign businessman from agreeing to arbitrate or choosing a neutral forum to
settle disputes in which American securities laws might control. 65 American
courts would not be "ousted" of their jurisdiction.
IV. Zapata AND Scherk: A REJECTION OF PAROCHIALISM
A. Forum Selection
In two recent decisions, the Supreme Court has taken a radically different
view of forum selection clauses and arbitration agreements insofar as they
55. Section 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1970), provides in part: "The district courts of the
United States ... shall have jurisdiction ... concurrent with State and Territorial courts, of all
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this
subchapter."
56. 346 U.S. at 438.
57. Id. at 431.
58. Id. at 434-35.
59. Id. at 433-34.
60. Id. at 435.
61. Id. at 435-36.
62. Id. at 436-37.
63. Id. Justice Frankfurter pointed out that since failure to observe the law would constitute
grounds for vacating the award, "appropriate means for judicial scrutiny must be Implied, in the
form of some record or opinion, however informal, whereby such compliance will appear, or
want of it will upset the award." He went on to say that the majority ruling would be appropriate
in a case of unequal bargaining power or over-reaching, but such was not the case in Wilko. Id.
at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
64. See notes 17-27 supra and accompanying text.
65. See The Transnational Reach of Rule 10b-5, at 1393-94.
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apply to international transactions. In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 66
the Court was faced with an admiralty case involving a forum selection
clause. Zapata, an American corporation, had contracted with Unterweser, a
German corporation, to have Zapata's oceangoing oil drilling rig towed to
Europe. 67 The contract contained a clause specifying that all disputes would
be settled before the London Court of Justice and two exculpatory clauses
relieving Unterweser of any liability for defects of navigation or damage to
the drill. 68 The drill was damaged during a storm and towed to Tampa,
Florida where Zapata instituted a suit for damages. 69 The district court 70
and the Fifth Circuit,7 1 relying on Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S.S.
Monrosa,72 refused to dismiss the suit in favor of the British courts. The Fifth
Circuit also relied on the fact that British courts would enforce the exculpa-
tory clauses which, according to Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 73 were
contrary to United States public policy.
74
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, 75 immediately rejected the
"parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in
our courts."
' 7 6 He went on to say,
[In an era of expanding world trade and commerce, the absolute aspects of the
doctrine of the Carbon Black case have little place and would be a heavy hand indeed
on the future development of international commercial dealings by Americans. We
cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclu-
sively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts."
The argument that forum selection clauses oust a court of jurisdiction was
rejected as "hardly more than a vestigial legal fiction" designed to protect "the
66. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). For a discussion on the creation of a climate favorable to a Zapata
ruling, see Nadelmann, Choice-of-Court Clauses in the United States: The Road to Zapata, 21
Am. J. Comp. L. 124, 127-34 (1973).
67. 407 U.S. at 2.
68. Id. at 2-3 & n.2.
(9. Id. at 3-4.
70. 296 F. Supp. 733 (M.D. Fla. 1969), aff'd, 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), vacated, 407 U.S.
1 (1972).
71. 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), vacated, 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
72. 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959); see notes 42-43 supra
and accompanying text.
73. 349 U.S. 85 (1955).
74. 428 F.2d at 894-95. The Fifth Circuit's opinion was subject to severe criticism. One
commentator viewed it as demonstrating "a total disregard for the necessities of international
business relations and the principle of party autonomy." Delaume 301. A British writer decried
the court for its "narrow nationalism" and went on to say. "The American federal court entirely
failed to appreciate that choice of jurisdiction in an international commercial transaction is not a
minor clause relating to machinery but very often a vital factor in negotiations. Every prac-
titioner must know of cases where contracts would never have been entered into but for the
choice of some particular law or jurisdiction. If such choices are to be so freely disregarded the
whole point of having a rational system of private international law will have disappeared."
Collins, Forum Selection and an Anglo-American Conflict-The Sad Case of the Chaparral, 20
Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 550, 557 (1971).
75. The decision was 8-1, Justice Douglas dissenting.
76. 407 U.S. at 9.
77. Id.
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power and business of a particular court." Such arguments have "little place
in an era when all courts are overloaded and when businesses once essentially
local now operate in world markets. '78
The Court declared that forum selection clauses are prima facie valid unless
enforcement can be shown to be unreasonable. 79 Such agreements made "in
an arm's-length negotiation by experienced and sophisticated businessmen"
should be enforced "absent some compelling and countervailing reason."'80
The Court recognized that the acceptance of a neutral forum by both parties
was the result of extensive negotiations aimed at the elimination of the
uncertainties so often found in international business dealings and, as such,
should be enforced.8 1
Perhaps even more significant than the strong language used by the Chief
Justice was the manner in which the Court distinguished the Bisso doctrine
that exculpatory clauses were against public policy. 82 The Court pointed out
that Bisso dealt with a similar situation strictly within American waters and
therefore was "not controlling in an international commercial agreement. "83
The Court implied that international commercial agreements would be placed
on a footing different from those in a purely domestic context.8 4 Zapata,
however, was an admiralty case and it was not clear whether such an
interpretation would be restricted to admiralty. It also was unclear whether
the decision forecast a trend toward a more liberal approach to the enforce-
ability of clauses in international contracts generally.
78. Id. at 12.
79. Id. at 10. The Court analogized to National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent which held:
"[I]t is settled... that parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of
a given court, to permit notice to be served by the opposing party, or even to waive notice
altogether." 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964). But see 8 Texas Int'l L.J. 85 (1973) where the author
argued that, in Szukhent, "the real issue was the adequacy of service under Rule 4(d) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" and that the Zapata reference to Szukhent was nothing more
than "a questionable attempt to embellish the instant holding with a sense of continuity." Id. at
90.
80. 407 U.S. at 12. Such compelling reasons were described as "fraud, undue influence, or
overweening bargaining power." The Court required the showing of one of these compelling
reasons before the forum selection clause would be dishonored. Id. at 12-13, 15. Inconvenience
was almost totally rejected as a compelling reason when the Court stated: "[Ilt should be
incumbent on the party seeking to escape his contract to show that trial in the contractual forum
will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will for all practical purposes be deprived of
his day in court. Absent that, there is no basis for concluding that it would be unfair, unjust, or
unreasonable to hold that party to his bargain." Id. at 18.
81. Id. at 13-14; see Collins, Forum Selection and an Anglo-American Conflict-The Sad
Case of the Chaparral, 20 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 550, 556-57 (1971). The author pointed out that
businessmen who negotiated the Zapata type of contract "know their law" and "know their
courts." Id. at 556.
82. See notes 73-74 supra and accompanying text.
83. 407 U.S. at 15-16.
84. See 58 Cornell L. Rev. 416, 421 (1973).
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B. Arbitration Clauses
Two years later, the Supreme Court answered these questions in Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co. 8 5 Alberto-Culver was an American corporation which
entered negotiations with Scherk, a German national, regarding the purchase
of three European business corporations and the licensing of certain
trademarks associated with them. Negotiations extended over a period of
three years and culminated in a purchase agreement which included express
warranties that Scherk had sole and unencumbered rights to the
trademarks.8 6 The contract also contained a clause which provided for the
settlement of all disputes by arbitration before the International Chamber of
Commerce in Paris with the laws of the State of Illinois controlling.8 7
Approximately one year later, Alberto-Culver discovered that the
trademarks were seriously encumbered and, as a result, offered to return the
properties and rescind the contract. When Scherk refused, Alberto-Culver
brought an action in a federal district court claiming that the fraudulent
representations violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.88 Scherk responded by seeking a stay of the action pending arbitration;
Alberto-Culver countered by seeking an injunction restraining arbitration.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 9 relying on Wilko, 90 decided
in favor of Alberto-Culver and enjoined the arbitration. 9' The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising out of
international commercial transactions "is to be respected and enforced by the
federal courts in accord with the explicit provisions of the Arbitration Act. ' "2
The Supreme Court initially ruled that, since the Scherk transactions
involved commerce with foreign nations, the Arbitration Act of 192593 was
applicable as it was in Wilko. 94 The Court also pointed out that since Wilko
dealt with the Securities Act of 1933 and Scherk involved the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, "a colorable argument could be made that even the
semantic reasoning of the Wilko opinion does not control . . ... 9 Nonethe-
85. 94 S. Ct 2449 (1974).
86. Id. at 2451-52.
87. Id. at 2452.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
89. 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 94 S. CL 2449 (1974).
90. See notes 49-63 supra and accompanying text.
91. The Seventh Circuit pointed out that Zapata would be controlling if the transaction did
not come under the securities law. 484 F.2d at 614-15.
92. 94 S. Ct. at 2457 (footnote omitted).
93. 9 U.S.C. §§ I et seq. (1970). The Court placed emphasis on sections 2-4. 94 S. CL at
2453. Section 2 provides that arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1970). Id. § 3 permits federal courts to stay any pending action until "such arbitration has
been had .... " Id. § 4 authorizes the court to issue "an order directing the parties to proceed to
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement." See notes 45 & 52 supra.
94. See notes 53-56 supra and accompanying texL
95. 94 S. CL at 2454. The Court did not rule on whether the purchase of Scherk's business
was a security transaction under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 since that
judgment of the Seventh Circuit was not appealed. Id. at 2455 n.8. Justice Douglas, in his
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less, the Court decided, for purposes of this case, to treat the pertinent
provisions of both acts in a similar manner96 and distinguished Wilko on
different grounds.
The "significant" and "crucial" difference between Wilko and Scherk was
that the latter dealt with "a truly international agreement. '97 The Court listed
the three factors which made the agreement "international." First, the parties
to the agreement were of different nationalities with the bulk of their
activities in their respective home countries. Second, the negotiations took
place in three nations and involved legal and trademark experts from four
nations. Finally, and most significantly, the "subject matter" involved the sale
of businesses incorporated in Europe and their "activities were largely, if not
entirely, directed to European markets."98 In Wilko, on the other hand, the
parties, negotiations, and subject matter were all situated in the United
States, and "there was no question but that the laws of the United States
generally, and the federal securities laws in particular, would govern
disputes . . ... 99 In international agreements, however, there is always a
great deal of uncertainty as to which country's law will be applicable to
disputes. Echoing Zapata, the Court went on to say:
A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be
litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable precondition
to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international
business transaction.100
The Court also pointed out that a "parochial refusal" to enforce interna-
tional arbitration agreements could lead to "destructive jockeying" by the
parties as each attempted to secure advantages from courts of various
countries. The problems of conflicting judgments from different nations'
courts would create a "dicey atmosphere" which "would surely damage the
fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and
ability of businessmen to enter into international commercial agreements."''1
This atmosphere would also make the Wilko rationale of protecting access to
the courts "chimerical" since such access could easily be blocked or hindered
by the opposing party's resort to foreign tribunals.' 0 2 Describing an agree-
ment to arbitrate as, "in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause,"
the Court concluded by recognizing the need to reject parochialism while
dissent, agreed with the Seventh Circuit that the Securities Exchange Act was controlling. Id. at
2458-59 (dissenting opinion). See generally Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662
(2d Cir. 1971); Lawrence v. SEC, 398 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1968).
96. 94 S. Ct. at 2455.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. The plaintiff in Scherk desired to limit Wilko to situations where there was unequal
bargaining power since the arbitration clause in Wilko was contained in a standard form margin
contract. The Court, however, pointed out that lack of choice had not been demonstrated in
Wilko and proceeded to decide the case on other grounds. Id. at 2454 n.6.
100. Id. at 2455.
101. Id. at 2456.
102. Id.
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encouraging the certainty which constitutes an "indispensable element" in
international commerce. 10 3
V. CONCLUSION
The holdings of Zapata and Scherk are quite clear. In international trade
and commerce, "experienced and sophisticated" businessmen will no longer
be able to depend on American law and American courts to protect them from
unwise business dealings. If American businessmen agree to the settlement of
disputes either in a foreign forum or through the process of arbitration, the
expectations of the parties must be met. The requirements of international
commerce and the degree of certainty required by businessmen in such a
milieu necessitate a rejection of a "parochial" outlook toward foreign tribunals
or arbitration boards. An American businessman will no longer be able to
"repudiate his solemn promise.' I0 4
The Zapata and Scherk holdings, however, were not without qualifications.
In both cases, the agreements in question were what the Court in Scherk
described as "truly international."' 0 5 Although somewhat vague as to which
factors make an agreement truly international or essentially American, the
Court did provide some general guidelines. To qualify as international, the
parties, the negotiations, and the subject matter of the agreement must have a
substantially international character as was demonstrated in Scherk. 10 6 Such
agreements "touching" two or more countries almost inevitably result in
considerable uncertainty as to which nation's substantive and conflict of laws
rules will apply.10 7 The purpose of the Court's rulings was to eliminate this
uncertainty by providing judicial recognition to the parties' resolution of the
problem through forum selection or arbitration agreements. Such a solution
"obviates the danger" that the dispute will be submitted to a forum hostile to
one of the parties and it also helps to avoid the "dicey atmosphere" which
might result from conflicting rulings of courts of various nations. ° 8
103. Id. at 2457. Justice Stewart pointed out that the holding of the Court was confirmed by
the rationale of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, [1970] 3 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, and
the United States enabling legislation. 9 U.S.C. ch. 2 (1970). He stated that the goal of the
Convention was "to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration
agreements in international contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate
are observed .... ." 94 S. CL at 2457 n. 15. The Court did not use the Convention as a basis for
its opinion and did not reach the question whether the Convention would have served as an
alternate basis for enforcing the arbitration agreement. Id. at 2457-58 n. 15. On the Convention
and its enforcement, see Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. CL 2389 (1974); In re Fotochrome Inc., 377 F. Supp. 26
(E.D.N.Y. 1974); Firth, The Finality of a Foreign Arbitral Award, 25 Arb. J. 1 (1970); Quigley,
Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards, 58 A.B.A.J. 821 (1972); Quigley, Accession by the
United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 70 Yale L.J. 1049 (1961).
104. 94 S. CL at 2457.
105. Id. at 2455.
106. Id.
107. Id; see note 131 infra.
108. 94 S. CL at 2455-56.
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What is essentially American is best illustrated by Wilko. In that case, both
the parties were American; all of the negotiations took place domestically; the
subject matter of the negotiations was American securities; and there was no
doubt that American securities laws were the only ones applicable to the
transaction.' 0 9 Thus, the uncertainty as to conflict of laws, which was the
primary variable in Zapata and Scherk, was not present and, consequently,
there was no doubt that the transaction was "essentially American."
Obviously, these guidelines are not all-encompassing and, as the Court
recognized in Scherk," 0 we will have to await future litigation for more
precise rules. However, the Court did address certain problem areas. An
agreement between two Americans to settle disputes before a foreign court or
arbitrators will under Zapata suggest the question whether the agreement was
of the adhesion variety. I I I Similarly, the selection of a foreign forum to settle
disputes that are "essentially American" might contravene a public policy of
the United States." 2 Justice Douglas, in his dissent in Scherk, expressed the
fear that various multinational corporations might utilize the holding to
circumvent American statutes which should control their actions. 113 How-
ever, the requirement that the agreements be truly international, the rejection
of adhesion agreements and those contrary to public policy, as well as the
ability of federal courts to pierce the nationality veil,' "4 should be sufficient to
prevent the abuse of the Zapata and Scherk rulings.
It has also been said that the relegation of an American to a foreign forum
or arbitral tribunal could lead to a loss of substantive rights. " 5 It is true that
foreign courts may have different substantive and procedural rules; it is also
true that arbitral awards are not subject to review for errors of law or fact
and that a reasoned opinion is not required." 6 But these arguments are
merely the traditional ones against forum selection and arbitration. In the
case of arbitration awards, overly technical judicial review would defeat the
primary purpose of arbitration--speed, efficiency, and informality.' '1 The
Court in Zapata and Scherk limited its rulings to experienced and sophisti-
cated businessmen. The American parties in those cases were major corpora-
109. Id. at 2455.
110. Id. at 2456 n.11.
111. 407 U.S. at 17.
112. Id. Article V 2(b) of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards authorizes the courts of a participating country to reject an arbitration
agreement if it is "contrary to the public policy of that country." [1970] 3 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S.
No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, Article V, para. 2(b).
113. 94 S. Ct. at 2463-64 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
114. See SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987, 995 (S.D. Fla. 1963)
(the court looked through the "transparent fabric" of the defendants' scheme to observe that a
nominally Canadian corporate defendant was a mere conduit for the American corporate
defendants); Il A. Ehrenzweig & E. Jayme, Private International Law 128-29 (1973).
115. 407 U.S. at 23 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
116. Kawakami & Henderson, Arbitration in U.S./Japanese Sales Disputes, 42 Wash. L.
Rev. 541, 543 (1967); see note 44 supra.
117. Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. v. Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd., 457 F.2d 387, 389 (2d
Cir. 1972); see note 45 supra.
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tions that had access to extensive legal advice before entering into contracts.
Such businessmen (or businesswomen) must now consider the procedural and
substantive limitations of a foreign forum or arbitral tribunal before entering
into such a contract.
In addition, American courts still provide an adequate opportunity to be
heard. In the case of arbitration, access to the courts is available through
motions to compel or stay arbitration, to stay court proceedings pending
arbitration or to confirm the award."18 Similar access is available in the case
of forum selection as was demonstrated in Zapata. At any of these points, an
American party can show cause why the particular agreement should not be
enforced, but he must show "compelling reasons" such as fraud, undue
influence or overweening bargaining power. 1 9 Sophisticated businessmen
will no longer be able to plead reasons such as inconvenience when these
should have been considered at the time of the contract negotiations.120
Businessmen have been put on notice that when negotiating contracts, they
must be aware of forum selection or arbitration clauses and, if desired,
expressly designate the laws which are to be controlling, the issues to be
arbitrated, and the powers of the arbitrators.
One final question that should be addressed is the effect of Zapata and
Scherk on the extraterritorial application of American securities law. Scherk
arguably has removed any prohibition of arbitration agreements in interna-
tional securities transactions that Wilko may have imposed-at least so far as
experienced and sophisticated business executives are concerned. This per-
mission of arbitration in "truly international" agreements is similar to the
exemption permitting arbitration of disputes between various members of
organized stock exchanges. 1 2' In the latter instance, the securities laws were
construed as providing protection for individual investors and were not
designed to protect "dealers from the improprieties of fellow dealers.'1 2 2 In
essence, Scherk could be read as holding that the securities laws likewise were
not designed to protect large multinational corporations. However, the
question of the protection of the individual investor in such corporations
would still remain. Justice Douglas described these "corporate giants" as
"guardians of a host of wards unable to care for themselves,"' 2 3 and it was
these wards whom the securities laws were designed to protect. He also
pointed out that these investors could be the victims of the actions of the
multi-national corporations.1 24 The majority opinion responded to such criti-
cism by pointing out that Scherk had "no bearing on the scope of the
118. Symposium-Arbitration and the Courts, 58 Nw. U.L. Rev. 466, 522 (1963).
119. See note 80 supra.
120. Id.
121. Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1213-14 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 406
U.S. 949 (1972); Axelrod & Co. v. Kordich, Victor & Neufeld, 451 F.2d 838, 842-43 (2d Cir.
1971); Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. 766, 771-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
122. 287 F. Supp. at 771-72.
123. 94 S. CL at 2461 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 2464 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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substantive provisions of the federal securities laws," 125 and by this seemed to
imply that such questions would be answered on a case by case basis. Justice
Douglas, in his dissent in Zapata, pointed out that the Court has "often
adopted prophylactic rules rather than attempt to sort the core cases from the
marginal ones.' 26 It appears that the Court has rejected this prophylactic
approach to the securities laws in international business transactions and
implicitly has ruled that the impact of the transactions in Scherk on indi-
vidual Alberto-Culver shareholders was insufficient to necessitate the applica-
tion of American securities law.' 27
Scherk can also be analyzed in relation to the subjective territorial principle
which provided the basis for the Leasco decision. 128 In Scherk, Justice
Stewart pointed out that "[t]he only contacts between the United States and
the transaction . . . [are] the fact that Alberto-Culver is an American
corporation and the occurrence of some-but by no means the greater
part-of the pre-contract negotiations [were] in this country."' 29 These con-
tacts were judged too insignificant to apply the Wilko rationale; yet, in
Leasco, the Second Circuit found similar negotiations within the United
States to be conduct sufficient to create jurisdiction. 130 In other words,
contacts or conduct sufficient to create jurisdiction, under Leasco, may not be
significant enough to require the application of American law, under
Scherk. 131
Zapata and Scherk place international business dealings on a plane differ-
ent from domestic ones. If an American businessman agrees to submit to the
jurisdiction of a foreign court or arbitration, American law and American
courts will not provide the protection which the executive otherwise could
have enjoyed. Businessmen and their attorneys must henceforth be conscious
of the particular nuances of foreign law and arbitration rules and make an
educated selection according to their particular needs and expectations.
Zapata and Scherk hold that American courts cannot be relied upon to
compensate for ignorance or carelessness. Such rulings are necessary "in the
light of present-day commercial realities and expanding international
trade"' 32 if we wish to avoid imperiling "the willingness and ability of
businessmen to enter into international commercial agreements. 1 33
Thomas J. O'Connell
125. Id. at 2456 n.12.
126. 407 U.S. at 24 n. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
127. The court in Leasco also doubted whether the impact on shareholders alone would
suffice as a basis of asserting jurisdiction. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
However, four Justices did dissent in Scherk.
128. See notes 11, 22-27 supra and accompanying text.
129. 94 S. Ct. at 2456 n.11.
130. 468 F.2d at 1334.
131. In Scherk, the arbitration agreement specified that the laws of the State of Illinois would
apply. It is not clear whether an arbitral tribunal or a foreign court would construe this provision
as requiring application of rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 94 S. Ct. at 2463
n.11 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
132. 407 U.S. at 15.
133. 94 S. Ct. at 2456 (footnote omitted).
